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HOW THE JAPANESE LOST THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY

Thomas Wildenberg

Parshall, Jonathan B., and Anthony P. Tully. Shattered Sword:
The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. Washington, D.C.:
Potomac Books, 2005. 613pp. $35.00
Kernan, Alvin B. The Unknown Battle of Midway: The Destruction of the American Torpedo Squadrons. New Haven,
Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 2005. 181pp. $26.00

Midway was one of the most decisive naval battles of all time. It was a battle that
should have been won by the Japanese but wasn’t. Future American writers
would dub it an incredible or miraculous victory, based on the superiority of the
Japanese and the widely held perception before the battle that the Imperial Japanese Navy was invincible. During the six months of war preceding Midway the
Japanese carrier fleet rampaged unchecked throughout the Pacific, destroying
the U.S. battle line at Pearl Harbor and enabling Japan to seize the Philippines,
capture Singapore, and overrun the Dutch East Indies. Since the opening attack
on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese had conducted a series of spectacular campaigns
and smashing victories that seriously weakened American and Allied naval
power in the Pacific. The Japanese navy successfully attacked and damaged a significant portion of the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor, obliterated British seapower in
the Pacific, and won an overwhelming victory over the
Thomas Wildenberg received the Surface Navy Associahodgepodge of Allied forces that had been caught in
tion’s 2005 Literary Award for his article “Midway:
the Java Sea. To most observers it seemed as if the JapSheer Luck or Better Doctrine?” published in the Winter
anese navy was indestructible. Then came Midway—a
2005 issue of the Naval War College Review. His current project is a book on the history of the torpedo in the
battle in which a supposedly weaker American force
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won a spectacular victory that blunted the Japanese
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advance in the Pacific. It was the turning point in the
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war against the Japanese empire—the point at which the U. S. Navy took over
the strategic initiative, and after which it never looked back.
The battle of Midway was a tragic defeat for Japan and its navy. The Japanese
had placed their faith in quality over quantity and had trained and prepared to
defeat a numerically superior enemy. Yet, as Mitsuo Fuchiday and Masatake
Okumiya explained in Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan (Naval Institute
Press, 1955), “a stronger Japanese force went down to defeat before a weaker
enemy.” How and why this happened is explained in Shattered Sword, the first
new English-language book on the Japanese side of the story since Fuchida and
Okumiya’s Midway was published fifty years ago.
Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully have produced what will undoubtedly
become the definitive work on the Japanese navy at Midway. Although neither is
a Japanese linguist, they have acquired an amazing amount of information on
Japanese carrier doctrine, the planning that went into the Midway operation,
and the specific details of the air operations during the battle. Their narrative is
carrier-centric, told in terms of what would have been directly visible or otherwise knowable from the bridges of the Japanese carriers. This is a highly effective
technique, one that produces a clearly defined picture of the carrier operations
and aerial doctrine employed by the Japanese at Midway.
The book is organized into three sections: “Preliminaries,” in which the origins
and “political machinations” that led to the Japanese plan of battle are discussed;
“Battle Diary,” a detailed narrative of the battle; and “Reckonings,” a reexamination of the myths surrounding the battle of Midway and an enlightening analysis
of why the Japanese lost this historically important battle. Readers familiar with
other recognized works on Midway will find a wealth of new information here.
Scholars, military buffs, and serious students of the subject will appreciate the detailed, comprehensive battle diary that constitutes the bulk of the work. The text
itself is supplemented with numerous maps and well executed diagrams that are
extremely useful for interpreting the action. A great deal of additional information on Japanese aircraft, carriers, airmen, and aviation losses at Midway is also
given, in the extensive list of appendices.
One of the most delightful aspects of this work is the emphasis that the authors place on the importance of leadership and command. I was particularly
impressed by the way they compared and contrasted the personalities and leadership styles of the two main protagonists of the battle: Chester W. Nimitz, the
commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku,
commander in chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet. Much of the book focuses
on the errors committed by Yamamoto in “his schemes aimed at Midway.”
Parshall and Tully are right on the money when they state that “a commander’s
job is to orchestrate and direct the three major dimensions of combat—space,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/11
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time and force.” From their study they conclude that “Yamamoto’s plan [for the
Midway Operation] failed to address the concept of space in a flexible manner,”
that in “his attempt to be ‘divinely mysterious,’ he had rendered much of his fleet
purposeless through dispersion.”
Despite its formidable strengths, the Japanese navy committed at Midway a
series of irretrievable strategic, tactical, and operational mistakes that seem almost inexplicable. This forms the basis for the “unpleasant truth” of the authors’
compelling argument that “despite the Imperial Navy having opened the Pacific
war with one of the most daring military feats of all time—the massed carrier attack on Pearl Harbor—neither Yamamoto nor Naval GHQ truly comprehended
the strengths and weaknesses of the world-class weapons system [the aircraft
carriers of the First Air Fleet] they possessed.” Lastly, scholars will appreciate
Parshall and Tully’s efforts to debunk the legion of myths resulting from Midway, the most persistent being that in defeating the Japanese the U. S. Navy miraculously triumphed against overwhelming odds. This mistaken concept, as
the authors rightly point out, “has been echoed endlessly in almost every American text on the battle until it has been accepted as holy writ.”
While Shattered Sword gets high marks all around, it is not flawless. Historians
and academics accustomed to more scholarly writing may find some of the stylistic trappings somewhat disconcerting. The use of contemporary jargon and
colloquialisms is, at best, misplaced. Similarly, their decision to pack the
endnotes with reams of additional supporting information was unwise; further,
the index is so poorly constructed as to be almost unusable. It is deplorable that
the publisher, having acquired such an exceptional scholastic achievement,
failed to take care of these deficiencies and so spoiled an otherwise superb book.
Unlike Shattered Sword, which breaks new ground, The Unknown Battle of
Midway by Alvin Kernan merely retraces the steps of those who have come before. Kernan, a university professor of the humanities, served in the U.S. Navy
during World War II as an enlisted man and was aboard the carrier Enterprise
during the battle of Midway. The subject of this book, the destruction of U.S.
torpedo planes at Midway, is a worthy project, one that warrants further inspection and analysis. If Kernan’s idea is sound, however, his execution leaves much
to be desired. Readers of the Naval War College Review and other students of naval
history will find nothing new here. On the contrary, the book is so full of errors
and misconstructions of fact that it only further distorts the reasons behind the
tragic slaughter of the U.S. torpedo planes and their aircrews.
Although the author was an aviation ordnanceman, he confuses the 1,949pound Mark XIII-1 torpedo employed at Midway and the 2,216-pound Mark
XIII-10 of 1944. Much of the technical information cited in this book is either
outdated, inaccurate, or incorrectly analyzed (e.g., the U.S. Navy did not develop
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its early warning radar from the British; U.S. aerial torpedoes did not have
magnetic exploders; and the torpedo protection system is not a part of a ship’s
armor). The author’s lack of technical expertise can be quickly discerned, and
it frequently leads to errors in Kernan’s analysis of the battle.
Missing is any useful analysis of U.S. carrier doctrine or discussion of the
command decisions that necessitated a “maximum effort” on the part of each of
the U.S. carriers present at Midway. Yes, the destruction of the American torpedo planes was tragic, but as Parshall and Tully have shown in Shattered Sword,
the courageous attacks by the Navy’s torpedo squadrons critically affected the
course of this monumental battle.
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